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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The last ten to fifteen years have seen substantial deregulation in the 
financial sectors of most OECD economies. Early innovation in financial 
markets was motivated in part by the large incentives to circumvent 
official regulations.  Subsequently, financial change has been facilitated 
by  the progressive dismantling of  these  same regulations.  While 
liberalisation policies have been motivated mainly by the desire to 
improve efficiency within the financial system, important implications for 
the functioning of  the macro economy also arise. 
One of these is the presumption that financial market liberalisation has 
eased liquidity constraints facing households and has therefore allowed 
consumption to be smoothed over time.  If  households have rational 
expectations  and consume  from  permanent  income  (the RE-PIH 
hypothesis) then consumption can be shown to follow a random walk 
(see Hall  (1978)).  This model of  consumption behaviour  has been 
widely rejected in empirical tests, however.  These rejections, based on 
the  finding that  consumption behaviour is excessively  sensitive  to 
current disposable income, are frequently attributed to the failure of 
one  particular  maintained  hypothesis  of  the  PIH,  namely  that 
individuals with access to perfect capital markets can borrow or lend at 
the same interest rate to smooth consumption over their lifespans.  If 
financial liberalisation has rendered  capital markets somewhat less 
imperfect, and if  the above interpretation for the failure of  the RE-PIH 
to be  supported by the data is  correct, we should observe that the 
sensitivity of  consumption to current income has fallen over time and is 
lower in countries that deregulated earlier and more thoroughly. In attempting to test this proposition, the interpretation of  estimated 
sensitivity parameters is subject to some ambiguity. Several hypotheses, 
some maintained, underlie the random walk model of  consumption, 
notably that households are not liquidity constrained and that they do 
not  behave  myopically.  We  attempt to determine which  of  these 
hypotheses has failed by examining the random walk model both across 
time and between countries. 
The plan of  the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the Hall model of 
consumption and discusses the reasons that have been offered for its 
rejection in empirical tests.  Section 3 sets out modifications to the Hall 
model  to reflect  the  fact  that  a  certain proportion  of  households 
experience difficulties in borrowing against the collateral of  future 
labour income, and hence may be unable to attain the optimal profile of 
consumption over time implied by the PIH.  This section also reviews 
previous  empirical  work  which  used  this model  to  interpret  the 
importance  of  liquidity constraints.  Difficulties  experienced  with 
previous econometric studies guide the approach adopted in Section 4, 
where a version of  the standard model is used  to test whether the 
sensitivity of  consumption to income has declined in successive decades 
in countries where financial liberalisation has eased liquidity constraints 
over  time.  In  Section 5,  the  importance  of  pooling  to  allow  for 
cross-correlation of  residuals between countries (thus permitting more 
efficient  parameter  estimates)  is  demonstrated.  In  Section  6, 
time-varying parameter estimates of  countries that liberalised during 
the 1970s and 1980s are presented.  Finally, some concluding remarks 
are made in Section 7. 
2.  THE HALL MODEL AND MODIFICATIONS 
Over the last decade or so most research on aggregate consumption 
has taken the Hall (1978) model as a starting point of  analysis.  Hall 
argued that the PIH implies that consumption behaviour should obey 
the  first-order  conditions  for  life-time  utility  maximisation  of  a representative individual.  He begins with the conventional consumer 
model of  life-cycle consumption under uncertainty: 
Subject to a lifetime wealth constraint:  At = y  (I+r) -T(C~+~  - at%)  (2) 
.r=O 
where: 
Et  is the  expectations  operator,  conditional on  all  information 
available in time t; 
6  is the rate of  time preference; 
U(ct) is the one-period utility function; 
r  is the real rate of  return on assets, assumed to be constant over 
time; 
At  is the consumer's assets, excluding human capital; 
T  is the length of  economic life; 
ct  is consumption; 
at  is labour income, assumed to be stochastic, which is the model's 
only source of  uncertainty. 
Intuitively, an individual consumer, seeking to maximise his utility, is 
faced with the decision of  whether to consume today or at some time in 
the future.  This deasion will depend upon his rate of  time preference, 
the opportunity cost of  interest foregone on income consumed today, 
and his expectation of  the utility he would derive from consuming this 
income in the future. This may be written algebraically as: 
If  one  is  prepared  to  maintain  the  following  somewhat  strong 
assumptions regarding individual consumers: (i)  they have identical, time-separable preferences with a quadratic 
representation for instantaneous utility: 
(ii)  they cannot die in debt; 
(iii)  they have access to perfect capital markets in which the constant 
real rate of  interest is equal to the subjective rate of  time discount; 
and 
(iv) they form expectations of  future income rationally, 
the first-order condition for an optimum can be shown to be: 
where: 
elt is the error term and is uncorrelated with all variables known to 
the consumer at time t-1. 
Under these conditions, consumption follows a random walk.  The 
present level of  consumption is the optimal forecast of  its future level 
or, alternatively, changes in consumption are unforecastable. 
Alternatively, if the utility function is a power function of  the form: 
the behaviour of  consumers can be approximated by: where a drift term 0  is included to represent the long-run  rise in 
aggregate consumption. 
If  disposable income is assumed to be generated by a process of  the 
f onn: 
where: 
Xt-1  is a set of  variables known to the consumer at time t-I; 
ut  is a white-noise expectational error; 
then the coefficient  on any variable belonging to Xt.l  should not be 
significantly different from zero in a regression of  consumption on a 
constant, its own first lag and Xt-l  (equation (5)),  or in a regression of 
the rate of  growth of  consumption against a constant term and Xt-l 
(equation (7)). 
Using variants of  the Hall model, several researchers have found that 
current aggregate consumption is sigruficantly more sensitive to changes 
in  current disposable  income than the PIH predicts.  This  excess 
sensitivity is frequently rationalised  as arising from the presence of 
liquidity constraints.  In terms of  the life-cycle model, individuals make 
labour supply and consumption decisions over a  known lifetime. 
Income will typically fall short of  desired consumption in youth, exceed 
it in middle age, and again fall short of  it in retirement.  With perfect 
capital markets, individuals should be able to smooth consumption 
relative to income by borrowing when they are young and lending in 
middle  age.  In  the  presence  of  liquidity  constraints,  however, 
consumption  cannot  be  fully  smoothed  because,  for  example, 
households cannot borrow when they are young against their future 
labour income. 
Clearly,  a  breakdown  of  one  or  other  of  the  abovementioned 
maintained hypotheses underlying the derivation of  the random walk model, such as perfect capital markets;  rational expectations of  future 
labour income;  additive time-separable  preferences;  separability 
between consumption, leisure and other goods (Mankiw, Rotemberg 
and Summers (1985));  or constant real rates of  interest and discount 
rates (Mankiw (1981)), could cause current income to be sensitive to 
current consumption.  Furthermore, the pattern of  consumption for 
non-durables  will  be  affected  if  durables  and  non-durables  are 
non-separable in consumption, and if durables are subject to gradual 
adjustment to optimal levels.  Bernanke (1985) has suggested that the 
illusion of  excess sensitivity could consequently be created by the failure 
to account properly for durables expenditures.  Another factor which 
could potentially explain the observed  "excess"  sensitivity has been 
emphasised by Zeldes (1989a and b).  If  there is uncertainty about 
future labour income, then consumers will self-insure by engaging in 
precautionary savings.  An increase in such uncertainty will increase 
savings and reduce consumption relative to income.  In other words, 
relative to a world of  certainty, individuals'  current consumption is 
"too"  low and expected consumption growth "too"  high, again creating 
an impression of  "excess"  sensitivity. 
3.  CROSS-COUNTRY h COMPARISONS AND THE DEGREE OF 
FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION 
One procedure for evaluating the PIH is to postulate a general model 
within which both the PIH and the Keynesian model  (emphasising 
current income) are nested as special cases (as in Flavin (1985), Delong 
and Summers (1986), Jappelli and Pagano (1989), Campbell and Mankiw 
(1989) and Bayoumi  and Koujianou  (1989)).  The  significance  of 
transitory income in explaining consumption is assumed to be evidence 
against one or all of  the hypotheses listed in Section 2.  This paper 
focuses on the last two of  these, namely, no liquidity constraints and 
rational expectations, as the assumptions most likely to be responsible 
for the empirical rejection of  the random walk consumption model.1 
1  Augmenting  the nested specification by  including  a variable which causes 
consumers to experience liquidity constraints may permit the data to reject one or Following Hayashi (1982) and Delong and Summers (1986), Jappelli and 
Pagano (1989) modlfy Hall's  model of  consumption to allow for a 
proportion of  the population to be liquidity constrained. A first group 
of  consumers represent that proportion of  the total population who 
behave according to the RE-PIH and exhibit little if  any sensitivity of 
consumption to  transitory  income.  Jappelli and Pagano  (J and P) 
assume  quadratic  utility,  that is,  they  adopt equation (5) as their 
starting point, such that: 
where: 
A second group of  consumers represent that proportion, h, of  the total 
population who, perhaps because of  liquidity constraints, consume all of 
their disposable income instead of  obeying the RE-PIH: 
Total per capita consumption is then: 
other of  these competing explanations.  Flavin suggests that the unemployment rate 
is such a variable, since it can be interpreted as a proxy for the proportion of  the 
population subject to liquidity constraints.  Although a much greater fraction of the 
population  than  those  who  are unemployed  probably  experience  liquidity 
constraints, nevertheless an increase in unemployment will increase the fraction of 
the population who are constrained to consume from current disposable resources. 
The full gamut of  tests presented in this paper for a simpler model (focusing on 
current income) was also applied to the Flavin model.  Since the overall conclusions 
based on the two models are essentially no different, it was decided not to work 
with the Flavin model, which proved somewhat unwieldly for examining some of 
the issues raised. Simple algebraic manipulation of  equations (9), (10) and (11) yields an 
expression incorporating a non-linear constraint on the coefficient al: 
The  coefficient  h  measures  the  degree  of  excess  sensitivity  of 
consumption to income. The model implies that this coefficient can also 
be interpreted as the share of  income accruing to consumers who do 
not behave according to the RE-PIH. 
Equation  (12)  is  estimated  using  the  technique  of  non-linear 
instrumental variables  (NLIV).  This circumvents the inconsistency 
problems associated with using Ordinary Least Squares to estimate a 
system of  equations  exhibiting  correlated  errors  (the  transitory 
consumption error, et in equation (12), is likely to be correlated with ut 
in the disposable income equation (8)). The variables in Xt.l  of  equation 
(8) are used as instruments.  J and P use a constant term, a linear trend 
and the first  lag  of  consumption,  disposable income,  government 
expenditure and exports.  Estimated h  values may then be used to 
rank countries according  to  the degree of  financial liberalisation, 
provided the estimates are based on the same definitions of  regressors 
and instruments. Such comparisons also assume the degree of  financial 
liberalisation has not been subject to change over time. 
J and P  estimate equation  (12)  on  annual  data  for  seven  OECD 
countries.  Their results are interesting in terms of  the questions raised 
earlier.  They find that their estimates of  h for each country have 
roughly the reverse ordering to various measures of  consumer debt 
scaled by total consumption.  This suggests that those countries with 
greater access to credit markets or, alternatively, those with a greater 
desire to use them, show a smaller proportion of  the population that is 
liquidity constrained.  Separate examination of  a variety of  demand side 
factors suggests that these do not explain the differences in h values, 
leading the authors to conclude that capital market imperfections were 
the main factor. These results are intuitively appealing.  However, the approach appears 
to ignore the difficulties assodated with estimating equation (12) in 
levels  form;  such  estimation  requires  the  assumption  of  trend 
stationarity of  the regressors.  This  reservation with the model is 
echoed in Campbell and Mankiw (1991). The weight of  evidence from 
other studies conducted over a reasonable time period is  that at least 
some of  J  and Pfs regressors are non-stationary.2  West (1988) argues 
that, under certain circumstances, models containing one non-stationary 
regressor  may  still produce consistent  and asymptotically  normal 
estimators, provided that the regressor also exhibits non-zero drift.  A 
selection of  tests implemented on extended sample periods for two 
countries studied by J and P could not reject zero drifi in a number of 
the non-stationary variables (see Appendix).  It is also worth noting 
that  J and Pfs use of  annual data implies a very small number of 
observations (12 in the case of  Japan and around 20  for most of  their 
countries).  This is not an adequate sample period to estimate their 
model.  Nor do annual observations, which generate artificially smooth 
time averages of  quarterly data, capture the notion of  transitory income 
necessary to test the PIH. 
Attempts  to replicate and update J and Pfs non-linear instrumental 
variables  estimation for a selection  of  three of  their countries (the 
United States, Japan and Italy) were not satisfactory.  For  the United 
States and Japan, inconsistencies in the data were identified as the chief 
source of  difference between the findings reported here and those of 
J and P (see Appendix for detailed estimation results and comparisons): 
Existing tests for non-stationarity cannot be applied to J and P's data as the tests' 
powers  are  particularly  low  over  small  samples  containing  less  than 
100 observations.  Nevertheless, augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests 
are applied to extended sample periods for two of  the seven countries investigated 
by J and P.  The results are presented in the Appendix.  The small sample periods 
over which the non-linear estimation is performed (e.g. 12 observations for Japan, 
and an average of about 20  for other countries) poses problems for these tests of 
the individual variables,  and certainly for the adequate estimation of  J and P's 
model. (i)  J and P  define  their  consumption  variable  as  total  private 
consumption "...excluding expenditure on durables, defined as the 
sum of  appliances, furniture and means of  transportation" (~1102). 
This definition is applied to each of  the countries in their sample 
with the exception of  the United States.  Their US data appear to 
exclude  consumption  expenditure  on  non-durable  services. 
Correcting for this, the value of  1  rises from 0.21 to 0.42, altering 
the ranking of  the US from the second least liquidity-constrained 
country behind Sweden to the fourth (behind Sweden, Japan and 
the United Kingdom).  This result throws the US  out of  line with 
their ranking  in terms of  debt to  consumption.  Furthermore, 
updating the sample period for the US from J and P's  1961-1984 to 
1961-1990 leads to a rise in the 1  parameter from 0.42 to 0.51.  Since 
the period 1985 to 1990 encompassed increasing liberalisation and 
household borrowing, one might have expected the values of 1  to 
fall. 
(ii)  In the case of Japan, J and P's results could only be replicated when 
national  rather  than  personal  disposable  income,  and  total 
government outlays rather than the national accounts measure of 
government expenditure were used.  Consequently, estimates for 
Japan using definitions consistent with those for the United States 
increased J and P's  reported 1  value of  0.34  to 0.51.  This affects 
their ranking of  Japan (making it the fourth rather than the third 
least liquidity-constrained country). 
It did not prove possible to replicate J and P's  results for Italy using the 
data sources referenced. 
The sensitivity of  the  estimates of  1  to  precise  definitions  of  the 
variables used for consumption, income and instruments, together with 
the  above-mentioned  econometric problems  associated  with using 
non-stationary variables and a small number of  observations, led us to 
downplay the  findings of  J and P.  This  point  can  be  illustrated 
intuitively with the specific country example of  Sweden.  Both J and P 
and Campbell and Mankiw (C and M) (1991) rank Sweden as the least liquidity-constrained country amongst those studied. This does not sit 
well with the fact that the radical liberalisation of  Sweden's financial 
markets was delayed until the second half  of  the  1980s (certainly 
outside  of  J and P's  sample  period),  suggesting  that  other 
country-specific  factors might have influenced the estimate of  h (for 
example, unique social security arrangements). 
Similarly, important changes in the degree of  financial liberalisation 
occurred in a number of  the countries studied by J and P and C and M 
in the second half  of  the 1970s and throughout  the 1980s.  This is 
ignored by J and P and is touched on relatively briefly by C and M. 
The latter test whether h has been a linear function of  time, or was 
subject to a structural break in 1980, and find little (though not zero) 
support for either proposition.  This dismissal of  time variation in the 
responsiveness of  consumption to income could, however, be due to 
the very specific nature of  the tests carried out by C and M.  Thus h is 
unlikely to have been a linear function of  time prior  to  the major 
deregulatory moves.  With  regard  to  their  dummy variable  test, 
C and M do not permit the drift parameter to change, and they impose 
the value of  the co-efficient used to weight current and lagged changes 
in income.  By  forcing the intercept coefficient to be the same in both 
sub-periods, their estimates of  h may be biased. 
For  these  reasons,  and given  the  difficulties  with  cross-country 
comparisons, further exploration of  the extent to which X may have 
varied over time in response to financial liberalisation measures seems 
warranted. 
4.  ESTIMATES  OF  h  BY  DECADE  AND  THE  LIQUIDITY 
CONSTRAINTS INTERPRETATION 
The following steps were taken to overcome some of  the concerns that 
arose in applying the J and P approach.  First, utility was assumed to be 
represented  as in equation  (6), so that  non-liquidity  constrained 
consumers behave according to equation (7): l+r l/a 
where bo = 8  + [-I 
This avoids the non-stationarity problems discussed in the previous 
section.  Second,  it  was  assumed  that  current  consumption  of 
liquidity-constrained  consumers  is a  constant  fraction  of  current 
income -- so the expected rate of  growth of  consumption equals that of 
disposable income.  Even if liquidity constrained, it seems unreasonable 
to assume that Keynesian consumers always spend exactly all of  their 
income. This implies: 
Equations (13) and (14) are weighted according to the proportion of 
the population h that are liquidity constrained: 
where eqt = he3t + (1-h) e2t 
Third, quarterly time series of  all variables are employed.  Fourth, 
common consumption definitions are utilised to facilitate international 
comparisons.  Equation (15) was estimated for total consumption for 
eight OECD countries.3 It was also estimated for total consumption less 
the purchases of  durables for that subset of  countries for which such 
data are available.4 
3  The countries in question are the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. Some of  the results reported in Sections 4 
and 5 were just  reported in an early working paper version by  Blundell-Wignall, 
Browne and Cavaglia (1991). 
4  These countries are the United States, Japan, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
and Canada.  The results for total consumption less purchases of  durables do not 
yield  overall inferences  which  are sufficiently  different from  those  for  total 
consumption to warrant reporting, perhaps because of  the emphasis on the time Instrumental variables estimation was used  to examine whether the 
degree of  excess consumption sensitivity (which is measured by the h 
parameter in equation (15)) is linked to imperfect capital markets.5 This 
linkage is examined mainly by exploiting the knowledge that financial 
liberalisation has progressed over time, particularly in the 1970s and 
1980s.  If  the liberalisation process seen in financial markets has caused 
liquidity  constraints  to  be  progressively  relaxed,  then  estimating 
equation (15) for successive time periods should tend  to indicate a 
generally reduced size and significance of  the h parameter.  Three time 
periods are chosen, the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s (see Table 1 for 
precise dates).  These, of  course, may not be the economically most 
relevant  time  periods,  given  the  gradual  and diffuse  nature  of 
deregulation which makes it difficult to identify clear structural shifts. 
Nevertheless,  with  this  approach less  emphasis  is  placed  on  the 
cross-country ranking of  h than in the J and P paper.  Formal tests can 
be applied to differences in ;L  values for individual countries between 
decades. 
(a) Nested Model Estimates for Consumption 
Table l(p27) presents the results from estimating equation (15), in its 
change in logarithms form, for eight large OECD countries. Overall, the 
results  suggest  the  excess  sensitivity  parameter  h  varies  across 
countries, as does its pattern over time.  The United  States, Japan, 
Canada and Australia show evidence of  declining liquidity constraints. 
For  the United States economy,  there is no evidence that liquidity 
constraints  were  lessened  in  the  1970s  compared  to  the  1960s. 
However, the h parameter falls from a significant value of  0.47 in  the 
1970s to a statistically insigruficant value of  0.25 in the 1980s, which is 
variation of  A.  These results are available, however, on request.  It is also worth 
recalling that use of  total consumption is less likely to create the illusion of excess 
sensitivity due to the stock ad.justment of  durables (Bernanke 1985). 
The instruments actually employed for the lag level of  disposable income are 
three lags of  this variable itself, as well as three lags on the lag level of personal 
consumption, the unemployment rate, and total exports, all in per capita terms, as 
well as contemporaneous population and a time trend. consistent  with  reduced  liquidity  constraints.  For  Japan,  the 
magnitudes  of  the  estimated 1  parameter  suggest  that  liquidity 
constraints in the 1980s are less severe than they were in either the 
1960s or 1970s.  The size and pattern of  estimated  coefficients for 
Canada and Australia are quite similar.  The 1  estimate for Australia is 
sigruficant in all three decades, but it declines in value during the 1970s 
and 1980s.  The pattern for Canada conforms closely to expectations, 
since Canada was one of  the first counties in the sample to deregulate 
its financial markets. 
The results for Germany, France and Italy are similar in that they show 
no evidence of  declining liquidity constraints.  For Germany, the 1 
parameter is significant at the 5 per cent level for all three subsample 
periods, and increases in value from 0.37 in the 1960s to 0.67 in the 
1970s and to 0.98  in the  1980s.  Given that German households are 
known to have a strong preference for saving, increasing precautionary 
saving behaviour in the more uncertain environments of  the 1970s and 
1980s, together with the presence of  liquidity constraints, might explain 
our results.  For  France,  a significant excess sensitivity parameter 
(h=0.40) is estimated when the extended period of  the 1960s and 1970s 
together is used  (see final column of  Table 1).  The robust  errors 
estimate of  the 0.31 coefficient for France in the 1980s suggests little 
easing of  liquidity constraints in this period.  Similarly, the Italian results 
show little change in the estimated values of  h (within the range of 0.43 
to 0.47) between decades. 
The United Kingdom results appear to have little in common with the 
two groups of  countries discussed  so far.  The  PIH  appears to  be 
accepted  by  the  data  in  the  1960s and  1970s, but  the  size  and 
sigruhcance of  the 1  parameter both increase during the 1980s.  Possible 
reasons for this are discussed in Section 6. 
Campbell and Mankiw (1989) observe that an estimate of  the excess 
sensitivity parameter close to  zero, even if  statistically significant, 
supports the PIH,  while a  large value of  this coefficient  suggests 
rejection.  According to this criterion, the pattern of  the h parameters across decades generally suggests easing liquidity constraints in four of 
the countries considered, but not in Germany, France, Italy and the 
United  Kingdom.  However,  it is possible  to  test  more  rigorously 
whether declines in the 1  parameter in successive time periods are 
significant in a statistical sense.  The results, based on the unit normal 
distribution, are given in Table 2.  The null hypothesis is that the 1  value 
in the most recent period is smaller than in the preceding period.  These 
results are a strong qualification to any interpretation based on the 
Campbell and Mankiw criterion.  Only in a few instances (indicated by 
asterisks) does this test accept the null hypothesis of  falling liquidity 
constraints. 
(b)  Asymmetries in the Nested Model 
Implicit in the above tests is the proposition that liquidity constraints 
encountered will have the same effect regardless of  the direction of 
movement in disposable income.  This assumption may be unrealistic, 
since reductions in income are likely to be  more constraining than 
increases -  at least for large changes in income.  If  the consumer is 
rationed in credit markets and current income falls substantially then 
consumption  must fall.  If  income increases under the same credit 
market  conditions,  consumption may  or may  not  increase.  This 
asymmetry  may  be  important  for  individuals  with  little  or  no 
non-human wealth, for whom necessary  expenditure is a very large 
percentage of  disposable income.  Therefore, the presence of  this type 
of asymmetry can be taken as further evidence of  liquidity constraints. 
Moreover,  as these  constraints  unwind  over  time  with  financial 
liberalisation, so should the magnitude of  the asymmetry. 
To test this proposition, the current values of  the change in disposable 
income are transformed as follows: 
zero, otherwise zero, otherwise 
The hats indicate instruments obtained on yd  using the exogenous 
variables already noted (see footnote (5)).  The test equation (15) is 
now rewritten as follows: 
Tests for asymmetric behaviour based on equation (16) are carried out 
with a simple t-test.  The null hypothesis is assumed to be h2 >  ;Ll and 
the alternative that h2 5 XI. The results  are presented in Table 3. 
The null hypothesis of  sigtuficant asymmetries is accepted at the 5 per 
cent level for the United States, Germany and Canada for the 1960s; 
Japan, Italy and Canada for the 1970s;  and France, Italy and Australia 
in the  1980s.  Furthermore,  when  asymmetry  was accepted,  the 
magnitude of  the response of  consumption to a fall in income was, in 
most cases, several multiples of  the effect of  an equivalent increase in 
income.  In no case was the effect on consumption of  an increase in 
income significantly greater than that for a fall.  These results lend 
further support to the liquidity constraints interpretation of  the excess 
sensitivity parameter.  They also further corroborate the evidence 
already  reported  of  easing  liquidity  constraints  over  successive 
decades.  This conclusion is inferred on the basis of  the magnitude of 
the  average differences  in the  hl and X2  estimates  in successive 
subperiods  (2.27,  0.29  and  0.22  for  the  1960s,  1970s and  1980s, 
respectively6 (see the bottom panel of  Table 3)). 
(c)  Real and Nominal Interest Rate Effects 
An  attempt to add more realism to the nested consumption model in 
equation (15) is made by relaxing the assumption that the real interest 
rate is constant.  This allows for changng intertemporal substitution in 
These apparently systematic patterns may be biased by the very large h2 estimate 
for Italy for the 1960s.  If, in fact, there were very few observations on Ay- it might 
be operating as a dummy variable picking up some other influence. consumption.  The exclusion of  the real interest rate from the  test 
equation could conceivably be leaving real disposable income growth to 
pick up this changing intertemporal substitution effect, i.e. if real income 
growth and real  interest rates are correlated over time.  Nominal 
interest rate changes,  in the absence of  real interest rate changes, 
should of  course have no effect on consumption unless households are 
prevented from consuming from their permanent income by imperfect 
capital markets.  It has been argued  that such an imperfection in 
personal credit markets is reflected in banks' practice of  using virtually 
constant  repayment-to-current  income ceilings as criteria  for loan 
qualification.7  An ina-ease in the nominal rate of  interest, for a fixed 
real rate, may cause this ceiling to be breached  and the  potential 
borrower to be denied a loan.  Thus if the liquidity constraints theory is 
valid, consumption can be constrained by variations in both current 
disposable income and in nominal borrowing rates of  interest.  Unless 
nominal  interest  rate  effects  are controlled  for,  variations in  the 
imperfectly measured real rates could capture liquidity constraint effects 
coming from changes in nominal rates. 
To capture both intertemporal substitutions and liquidity constraints 
phenomena  arising  from  interest  rate  changes,  equation  (15) is 
accordingly amended as follows: 
An increase in last period's  real borrowing rate of  interest rt.l  reduces 
that period's consumption relative to that of  the current period (a>O). 
An increase  in the nominal interest rate it in this period for a fixed real 
rate  will  tighten  household  liquidity  constraints  and  dampen 
consumption expenditure (y<O)  if capital markets are imperfect. 
Wilcox (1989) refers to a recent American  Bankers  Association  textbook on 
consumer lending which suggests that a borrower's capaaty to repay a loan can be 
measured by the payment-to-income  ratio.  Wilcox concludes that, in practice, this 
means the current payment-to-current income ratio. The cross-country results from estimating equation (17) are given in 
Table 4.  They indicate support for significant changing intertemporal 
substitution  effects  for  the  United  States  (for  the  1960s/1970s 
subperiod and also for the 1980s) and for the United Kingdom (for the 
1970s and the 1960s/1970s subperiods).  There is also some weaker 
evidence for Japan favouring changing intertemporal  substitution 
effects.  Note,  however,  that for Italy in the  1960s this effect  was 
significantly negative.  These results are of  some interest in the light of 
the failure of  many recent empirical studies to uncover a significant 
positive  intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution (see, for example, 
Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985), Hall (1978), Campbell and 
Mankiw (1989) and Bayoumi and Koujianou (1989)). Nominal interest 
rate effects arising from liquidity constraints are significant for Japan 
(1960s/1970s), for Germany (1980s), for France (1970s), and for Italy 
and Canada (1960s).  However, for the United States, nominal interest 
rate increases appear to have promoted consumption in the 1980s. 
There is, therefore, some evidence of  both intertemporal substitution 
effects and liquidity constraint effects arising from real and nominal 
interest rate changes, respectively.  However, in no instance does the 
presence of  these effects require any substantive amendment of  the 
conclusions already arrived at with respect to the changing pattern of 
liquidity constraints across countries or over time.  Hence liquidity 
constrained  consumers  cannot  be  explained  away  by  allowing 
households to redistribute their consumption over time in response to 
changes in the intertemporal relative price. 
5.  CROSS-COUNTRY CORRELATION OF RESIDUALS 
AND POOLED RESULTS 
A worrying aspect of  the Table 1  results is the general inability to reject 
the null hypothesis that the declines in X  are significant according to the 
unit  normal  test.  This could  be  due to  the use  of  an inefficient 
estimation procedure.  An econometric issue not addressed in most of 
the  previous literature  concerns the  possible  importance  of  cross correlations between  the error terms  in  the  test  equations for  the 
countries being studied.  Thus, for example, income and consumption 
shocks  in  one  country  could  be  translated  through  standard 
international linkages to income and consumption shocks in others. 
Alternatively,  common  shocks  (e.g. oil  price  changes)  could  be 
important.  It is possible to take account of  this problem by pooling the 
data  for  a number  of  countries and using  a Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression Estimation (SURE) procedure to estimate individual country 
parameters.  This should enable more efficient estimates of  the h 
parameter. 
More efficient estimates might also be obtained if  the h parameter can 
be  estimated  jointly  for  a  number  of  countries  where  financial 
deregulation is thought to have been broadly similar, provided such a 
restriction  is  accepted  by  the  data.  This  requires  the  countries 
considered suitable for pooling to be chosen on a priori  grounds, i.e. on 
the basis of  what is known about the deregulatory policies in each. 
(a) Country Groupings Based on Information about Deregulation 
Financial regulations generally fall into two broad categories: 
(i) "rate/quantity"  regulations on bank deposits and loans, including 
ceilings on bank deposit rates and quantitative measures that have 
similar effects (credit ceilings, capital controls, etc.); and 
(ii)  "powers" regulations governing the extensiveness of  activities of 
individual financial institutions and their competitiveness. 
In  general  terms,  there  are  considerable  differences  in  emphasis 
between countries in the extent to which "ra te/quantity"  regulations 
have  been  removed  and/or  "powers"  regulations  still  apply. 
Developments are summarised  in Table 5.  The United  States, the 
United Kingdom, Canada and Australia moved relatively early and 
with some rapidity in removing rate/quantity and powers regulations. 
While some powers regulations still apply, their financial system may be described as highly competitive. Japan too has made important steps in 
the 1980s, removing capital controls at the beginning of  the decade, and 
gradually introducing market alternatives to regulated bank deposits 
throughout the decade.  Developments proceeded more cautiously in 
France and Italy, with capital controls being removed only gradually 
throughout the 1980s and rate/quantity  and powers regulations still 
applying fairly extensively over the full sample period used here.  While 
Germany  was one of  the first  countries to  remove  rate/quantity 
regulations in  the 1960s and 1970s, it  has been  relatively  slow to 
implement "powers"  deregulation.  As a result, competition between 
German  banks  has  remained  muted,  and  short-term  financial 
instruments paying market returns have not been readily available as 
alternatives to bank deposits throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
On this basis our sample of  countries can be divided into two groups.8 
In  the first  group, the United  States, Japan, the United  Kingdom, 
Canada and Australia are classified as countries that have implemented 
substantial liberalisation policies.  The second group consists of  the 
continental European countries, Germany, France and Italy, which have 
been much slower to deregulate.  Having decided on this separation of 
countries,  the  test  equations can  be  estimated for  each  group of 
countries as a system using a SURE technique and the instrumental 
variables for income already described above. 
(b) Empirical Results 
The results of  this estimation procedure for group 1 are displayed in 
Table 6.  No cross-equation parameter constraints are imposed in the 
top panel, and the results differ from those in Table 1  only to the extent 
that they take in to account possible contemporaneous cross-correla tion 
of  residuals.  Panel 2 of  the table displays the results that emerge when 
the excess sensitivity parameter is constrained to be the same across 
countries in each subperiod.  The validity of  this constraint is tested 
using a likelihood ratio test.  Finally, the joint constraint of  equal slopes 
and intercepts is imposed across countries for each subperiod and again 
See Blundell-Wignall, Browne and Manasse (1990) and further references therein. the validity of  this constraint is  tested using the chi-squared test based 
on likelihood ratios.  This result is reported in panel 3 of  the table.  The 
United Kingdom is excluded because  the  data did not  accept the 
restriction that its X  value was the same as the other countries in the 
group* 
For the other countries in group 1, the excess sensitivity parameters 
have changed somewhat in value relative to the Table 1  estimates and, 
as expected, the corresponding sample standard errors have fallen in all 
cases.  The results shown in the top panel show declining X values in 
the 1980s compared to either the 1970s or the 1960s for all countries. 
The revised results for the unit normal tests are shown in Table 7.  In 
contrast to the earlier results shown in Table 2,  the decline in X  in the 
1980s compared to either the 1970s or to the 1960s is significant for 
both the United States and Japan.  In the case of  both Canada and 
Australia, the value of  h is significantly lower in the 1980s compared to 
the 1960s. 
While the constraint that X  be identical across countries cannot be 
rejected  for  any subperiod, the  additional constraint that  the drift 
parameter also be the same across countries is  rejected for two of  the 
four subperiods.  Applying the unit normal tests to the jointly estimated 
h values in panel 2 of  Table 6, sigruficant liquidity constraint relaxation 
for this group of  countries cannot be rejected for the 1980s compared 
to the 1960s (at the 5 per cent level) nor for the 1980s relative to the 
1970s (at the 10 per cent level).  However, no significant reduction in 
liquidity constraints is indicated for the 1970s compared to the 1960s, 
despite  a  substantial fall  in  the  magnitude  for  the  group excess 
sensitivity parameter.  Abstracting from issues of  statistical sigruhcance, 
and focusing on the magnitude of  the common X estimates for Group 1 
(panel 2),  the  results  say  that  the  number  of  households  which 
experienced liquidity constraints fell from 38 per cent in the 1960s to 
29 per cent in the 1970s and to 14 per cent in the 1980s. 
For the second group of  countries (Germany, France and Italy), shown 
in Table 8, the pooled individual country results are broadly similar to those  in Table 1.  However,  the  likelihood  ratio  test  rejected  the 
imposition of  a common X  across countries for the 1980s.  None of  the 
remaining constraints can be rejected at the 5, or even 10 per cent level 
of  significance.  Therefore, applying the normal tests to examine the 
sigruhcance of  changes in the cross-country constrained X for the 1980s 
compared to the other subsamples is clearly invalid. The 1970s common 
h  value is fractionally higher though not significantly different from 
that of  the 1960s. 
6.  TIME-VARYING PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
To further explore the value of  X  over time, the instrumental variables 
equation (15) is estimated as a rolling regression.  The initial sample 
period is  chosen to reproduce the value of  1  for the 1960s reported in 
Table I.  Its value is then allowed to vary by adding an observation, 
while keeping  the  total number of  data points in each  regression 
unchanged  (ie dropping the earliest observation from the previous 
regression).9  Only the countries in which finanaal liberalisation was 
thought to be important over the sample period are considered here, 
including the  United Kingdom, which  was excluded  for  technical 
reasons from the SURE procedure.  The results, shown in Chart 1, 
permit further interpretation of  the earlier findings. 
What is particularly striking is the apparent correlation of  changes in X 
with factors other than financial liberalisation which influenced liquidity 
constraints prior  to  the  1980s.  For  all five  countries,  the  excess 
sensitivity parameter declines in the late 1960s and/or the early 1970s 
(though much less so in the case of  Australia).  This corresponds with 
the easing of  monetary policy at the time, which saw liquidity in the 
form of  money balances expand rapidly.  In the case of  the United 
Note that this does not necessarily reproduce the Table 1  1980s  estimates as the 
last observation of  X  in the graph.  This  is because the length of the "1960s" sample 
period differs (depending on data availability) for each country. Kingdom,  there  was also  a  credit explosion  in  the wake  of  the 
introduction of  Competition and Credit Control in 1971.  The ready 
availability  of  money  balances  reduced  liquidity  constraints 
independently of  the degree of  financial regulation.  However, the first 
oil shock in 1973 and 1974, and the firming of  monetary policy at the 
same time,  appears  to  have  reversed  these  developments.  The 
well-known transmission of  a world-wide downturn in activity, in the 
presence  of  regulated  capital markets,  saw a  marked  rise  in the 
dependence of  consumption  on  current  income  -  a  phenomenon 
probably associated with increased precautionary saving behaviour. 
These common patterns in response to shocks, it is  worth noting, are 
consistent with the rationale given for the importance attached to the 
pooled (SURE) results presented in Section 5. 
During the second half  of  the 1970s and/or throughout  the 1980s, 
financial liberalisation became much more widespread in all of  the 
countries considered here (Table 5).  Moreover, following the inflation 
and income shocks of  the 1970s, financial innovations to avoid existing 
regulations had in any case become more widespread.  In the case of 
the  United States,  the  Volker  disinflation  from 1979 to  1981 was 
associated with some rise in the excess sensitivity parameter.  But 
following major deregulatory moves in the early 1980s, the sensitivity of 
consumption to current income appears to have moved into a phase of 
a sustained decline, despite major changes to the stance of  monetary 
policy, the stock market crash and other shocks.  In the cases of  Japan, 
Australia and Canada there are also sustained declines from either the 
late 1970s or early 1980s, in spite of  major nominal and real shocks 
during the 1980s. 
Only the case of  the United Kingdom presents something of  a puzzle. 
From the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s, there is a sustained decline in the 
excess sensitivity parameter, in much the same way as for the other 
countries in this group.  However, from about 1987 there is a marked 
reversal of  this trend, a phenomenon which probably explains why the 
UK  was rejected for pooling in Section 5.  The reasons for this pattern are unclear, but one possibility is that financial institutions themselves 
may impose liquidity constraints.  Throughout the second half  of  the 
1980s, there was a remarkable build-up of  debt in relation to net worth 
within the UK household sector.10  Asymmetric information problems in 
these circumstances, and in the absence of official regulations, may lead 
to equilibrium credit rationing by financial institutions.11 Alternatively, 
after a period of  excessive borrowing following financial liberalisation, a 
debt overhang may have generated more conservative attitudes on the 
part of UK  households. 
This possibility underlines a more general qualification to the finding 
that excess sensitivity of  consumption to income declined in the late 
1970s  and  throughout  the  1980s in  a  number  of  countries  that 
liberalised their financial markets. Financial liberalisation in the presence 
of  pre-existing  excess  demand for  credit  by  households  could be 
associated with once-for-all portfolio re-adjustments and period-specific 
apparent declines in the excess sensitivity parameter which might later 
be reversed.  While this must be considered a very real possibility, it is 
nevertheless the case that countries in this group other than the United 
Kingdom all show evidence of  increased consumption smoothing, in 
spite  of  widely  differing  experiences  with  regard  to  household 
indebtedness and shocks to real income experienced in the  1980s. 
Thus, for example, Australian households were relatively conservative 
in  their borrowing through the 1980s (Callen 1991), and still show 
strong evidence of greater consumption smoothing in the face of major 
adverse movements in the terms of  trade in the middle of  the 1980s.  It 
is possible, therefore, that the UK  household sectors' excessive use of 
lo UK experience over this period is summarised by Franklin et al(1989).  "  The credit rationing proposition resulting from asymmetric information is most 
clearly exposited in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Bernanke and Gertler (1989) present a 
model in which cyclical variations in the level of  economic activity are amplified via 
the effects of  agency costs on the price of  external funding.  The greater the level of 
corporate net worth the lower are agency costs.  But  net worth generally varies 
procyclically,  aggravating  deadweight agency costs,  reducing  investment and 
magnifying the extent of the downturn in activity.  This effect reverses itself for an 
upturn in activity.  Similar models have been presented by Greenwald and Stiglitz 
(1989), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990) and Williamson (1987). credit markets may itself be a period specific and a relatively unique 
phenomenon. 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
According  to  the  econometric  evidence  presented  in  this  paper, 
aggregate  consumption in  the  United  States,  Japan, Canada  and 
Australia seems to be less responsive to fluctuations in income in the 
1980s than in the 1970s or 1960s. The favourite candidate for explaining 
this phenomenon is the combined and reinforcing effects of  financial 
liberalisation (the progressive lessening of  the extent and intensity of 
official regulations in both national and international capital markets) 
and innovation.  Further support for this conclusion was also evident in 
the findings for countries where a priori information suggests a lack of 
financial liberalisation over the sample period.  While inter-country 
comparisons of  precise X values are unreliable, for reasons discussed in 
section 111,  there is nevertheless little evidence to suggest declines in this 
parameter in the cases of  Germany, France and Italy. 
These conclusions are based on empirical tests which hinge on an 
equation derived on the basis of  several maintained hypotheses.  A 
finding of  excess sensitivity of  current consumption to  disposable 
income could be the consequence of  a failure of  one or more of  those 
hypotheses.  However,  the broad  pattern  displayed by  the excess 
sensitivity parameter,  both  across countries and over  time,  is best 
accounted for by  the changing pattern of  deregulation and financial 
innovation in most cases. This conclusion obtains firther corroboration 
from  tests  that  reveal  some asymmetric  household  consumption 
behaviour in response to increases and decreases in income combined 
with  a  tendency  for  the  magnitude  of  these  asymmetries  to  fall 
systematically over time.  Nor are the results altered when allowance is 
made for changing intertemporal substitution effects.  One of  the main 
contenders for the rejection of  the random walk consumption model is 
a failure of  the rational expectations maintained hypothesis.  But  for 
many countries the results obtained would imply that consumers were becoming systematically less myopic over time.  That this could occur 
independently of  financial liberalisation seems unreasonable. 
To  the extent that  greater consumption smoothing possibilities  are 
associated with increasing financial liberalisation, there are likely to be 
important implications for policy.  Household demand will depend much 
more  on  the behaviour  of  real interest  rates,  financial prices  and 
expectations, which operate via wealth and intertemporal substitution 
effects, than on any shift in liquidity constraints that can be manipulated 
easily by  the authorities.  Perceptions about the longer-run goals of 
monetary policy actions which might influence permanent income are 
therefore more likely to be important influences on household demand 
than any fluctuations in interest  rates perceived  to be  temporary. 
Furthermore, short-run fiscal policy measures may be a relatively less 
useful tool for demand management in circumstances where liquidity 
constraints are not binding.  This is because transitory income is less 
relevant for spending decisions as the proportion of  the population 
who are liquidity constrained declines. Table 1:  Slope (k)  OLS (instrumental variables) Estimates 
&ct=p+mPt+et 
Individual country results 
United States  0.50  0.47  0.25  0.27 
(1956:l-1988:4)  (0.18)++  (2.46)  (0.12)++  (2.21)  (0.18)  (1.98)  (0.12)"  (1.96) 
(0.19)++  (0.17)++  (0.22)  (0.18) 
Japan  0.42  0.31  0.14  0.34 
(196O:l-1988:l)  (0.17)++  (1.98)  (0.07)++  (2.31)  (0.09)  (1.93)  (0.07)++  (2.14) 
(0.17)++  (0.08)  ++  (0.08)  (0.05)++ 
Germany  0.37  0.67  0.98  0.56 
(196O:l-1988:l)  (0.13)++  (2.74)  (0.17)++  (2.67)  (0.20)++  (2.71)  (0.12)++  (2.79) 
(0.10)++  (0.20)++  (0.10)++  (0.13)++ 
France  0.48  0.12  0.31  0.40 
(1963:l-1988:l)  (0.28)  (2.18)  (0.19)  (2.45)  (0.20)  (2.51)  (0.21)+  (2.44) 
(0.40)  (0.17)  (0.15) 
+
+
  (0.24) 
Italy  0.47  0.43  0.46  0.66 
(196O:l-1988:4)  (0.17)++  (0.40)  (0.19)++  (1.97)  (0.08)++  (0.96)  (0.14)++  (1  -80) 
(0.33)  (0.15)++  (0.1  I)++  (0.12)++ 
United Kingdom  0.08  0.12  0.14  0.09 
(1963:l-1988:4)  (0.19)  (2.73)  (0.12)  (2.45)  (0.12)  (2.05)  (0.12)  (2.52) 
(0.13)  (0.10)  (0.07)++  (0.09) 
Canada  0.30  0.21  0.16  -0.01 
(196O:l-1988:4)  (0.16)+  (2.81)  (0.16)  (2.29)  (0.14)  (1.33)  (0.16)  (2.31) 
(0.16)"  (0.1  I)+  (0.13)  (0.14) 
Australia  0.37  0.25  0.20  0.20 
(196O:l-1988:4)  (0.08)'+  (1.57)  (0.14)'  (2.03)  (0.10)++  (2.32)  (0.10)++  (1.74) 
(0.08)++  (0.08)++  (0.07)++  (0.07)+' 
Note:  Unadjusted standard errors and Durbin-Watson statistics are reported below the 
co-efficient. A second standard error is reported below these -  these are robust 
errors calculated with an autocorrelation correction of 4, as the data is quarterly. 
One and two asterisks indicate difference  from zero at the 10 and 5 per cent levels. Table 2:  Unit Normal Tests of the Hypothesis of Declining h Values 
in Later Relative to Earlier Periods - OLS  (instrumental variables) 
Individual country results 
United States  0.14,  0.12  1.02,  0.79  0.09, 
Japan  0.60,  0.59  1.49')  1.50'  1.75") 
Germany  -1.40,  -1.34  -1.18,  -1.39  -1.80, 
France  1.06,  0.83  -0.69,  -0.84  031, 
Italy  0.16,  0.11  -0.15,  -0.16  1.24, 
UnitedKingdom  -0.18,  -0.24  -0.12,  -0.16  -0.26, 
Canada  0.40,  0.46  0.24,  0.29  -0.79, 
Australia  0.74,  1.06  0.29,  0.47  0.00, 
Note:  Test statistics using unadjusted and adjusted SE estimates are reported 
respectively.  The test statistics presented in the table are calculated as 
follows: 
where hE and hL are the estimated coefficients  for the relevant earlier and 
later periods and 0~  and a~  are the corresponding variance estimates. Z is 
approximately normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance for 
moderately large samples (a condition fulfilled here with 40 observations 
for most subperiods). The critical values for the normal distribution at the 
5 per cent and 10 per cent levels are 1.65  and 1.29 res  vely.  Z values in 
excess of  these lead to acceptance of  the null hypo J? esis of  declining X's. 
One asterisk indicates that the null cannot be rejected at the 10 per cent 
level, and two that it  cannot be  rejected at the 5 per cent level.  The 
absolute values of  Z are presented in the table. Table 3:  Asymmetric Behaviour 
Test equation: AlnCt = p'  + klAhyt+ + k2Ahyt- + (1-h)ot 
Figures in parentheses are absolute values of  standard errors 
United States  0.40**  1.89**  0.41 **  0.60**  0.04  0.63 
(0.18)  (0.88)  A  (0.18)  (0.23)  R  (0.23)  (0.48)  R 
Germany  0.15  1.37**  0.72**  0.43  1.31**  0.70** 
(0.19)  (0.58)  A  (0.20)  (0.72)  R  (0.41)  (0.37)  R 
France  0.60  0.54  0.22  0.07  -0.17  0.84* 
(0.37)  (1.09)  R  (0.33)  (0.94)  R  (0.32)  (0.45)  A 
United  0.59*  -0.34  0.06  0.27  0.33*  -0.07 
Kingdom  (0.31)  (0.29)  R  (0.20)  (0.31)  R  (0.18)  (0.34)  R 
Canada  0.11  1.37*  -0.07  0.79  0.05  0.21 
(0.22)  (0.73)  A  (0.22)  (0.50)  A  (0.20)  (0.34)  R 
Australia  0.42**  0.26  0.25  0.49  0.05  0.47* 
(0.10)  (0.18)  R  (0.17)  (0.46)  R  (0.16)  (0.25)  A 
Average hl and 
h2 estimates  0.37  2.64  0.21  0.50  0.24  0.46 
across countries 
Note:  The null hypothesis &  is  I2>hl and the alternative that h2Q1. A value of 
the Z statistic (see Table 2) in excess of  1.65 or 1.29 indicates acceptance (A) 
of %  at the 5 and/or 10  per cent levels respectively.  R indicates rejection 
of %. Table 4:  Estimates for Equation (17) in  the Text, ie. 
Absolute t values in parentheses 
United States  h  0.36*  0.43**  0.20  0.23* 
(202)  (3.67)  (1.17)  (1.66) 
a  0.001  0.0007  0.001 **  0.001* 
(0.75)  (1.31)  (2.54)  (1.93) 
7  0.003  -0.0005  0.003*  -0.0003 
(0.53)  (0.21)  (  1.84)  (0.15) 
DW  215  2.10  1.96  1.99 
Germany  h  0.36**  0.66**  1.07**  0.53** 
(2.48)  (3.20)  (5.13)  (3.51) 
a  -0.001  -0.0003  -0.001  -0.001 
(1  -20)  (0.28)  (0.93)  (1.05) 
Y  0.17  -0.0001  -0.006**  -0.0001 
(0.99)  (0.11)  (2.19)  (0.14) 
DW  2.61  2.58  2.54  2,65 
France Table 4 (continued) 








X  Canada 
Note:  One and two asterisks indicate difference from zero at the 10 and 5 per 
cent levels.  Interest rate data for Australia were not available for a 
suffiaently long time period to complete the tests, nor were interest rate 
data available for France for the 1960s. Table 5:  Financial Liberalisation in the 1970s and 1980s 
Powers Deregulation  Foreign Exchange 
Raoe'Quandv  Competition Between  Deregulation of  Deregulation 
Intermediaries  Intermediaries 
(Rapid Liberalisation in the 1980s) 
United States  Mainly in  the late  From the mid-1970s  Always deregulated in 
1970s and early 1980s.  important.  1970s and 1980s. 
Camed out gradually  Gradual introduction  For all the 1980s (not 
through the 1980s.  of  new instruments,  1970s). 
mainly in 1980s. 
United Kingdom  Controls widely used  Being gradually  Removed controls in 
until 1980.  camed out mainly  1979. 








Always deregulated in  Always deregulated in  Always deregulated in 
1970s and 1980s.  1970s and 1980s.  1970s and 1980s. 
Controls widely used  Regulations eliminated  Removed controls from 
until early 1980s.  and foreign bank  1983. 
competition introduced 
in mid 1980s. 
(Countries Slow to Liberalise) 
Always deregulated in  Strongly controlled  Always deregulated in 
1970s and 1980s.  and little deregulation  1970s and 1980s. 
in 1970s or 1980s 
Cartel-like behaviour 
evident. 
Controls widely used  Being gradually  Controls widely used 
in 1970s and 1980s.  camed out mainly  and only in late 1980s 
from the mid 1980s.  phasing out begins. 
Cartel-like behaviour 
evident. 
Credit ceilings used  Ready availability of  Highly regulated in 
until 1983.  short Treasury Bills  1970s and most of the 
since 1975, but strong  1980s - some recent 




--- -  -- 
Source: OECD. Table 6:  Pooled Results:  Group 1 
(United States, Japan, Canada and Australia) 
United States  P' 
Japan  v' 
h 
Canada  P' 
h 
Australia  P' 
h 
(0.07)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.12) 





Note:  A SURE estimation technique and the same instrumental variables as for 













h  0.38" 
(0.06) 
Log likelihood  525.0 
0.004  0.003  0.004  0.004 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
h  0.4TC*  0.33"  0.14**  0.34** 
(0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Log likelihood  517.7  532.6  481.8  1002.5 Table 7:  Unit Normal Tests of the Hypothesis of Declining L  Values 
in Later Relative to Earlier Periods -- Pooled Estimates 
- -  -  - - - 
United States  0.05  2.25""  1.25  1.87"" 
Japan  0.80  1.31"  1.51""  1.56"" 
Canada  0.93  0.45  -0.10  1.50" 
Australia  1.02  0.22  0.00  1.53" 
Joint X  1.15  2.12""  1  .28"  3.07"" 
Note:  The test statistics presented in the table are calculated as follows: 
where XE and XL are the estimated coefficients for the relevant earlier and 
later periods and 0~  and o~ are the corresponding variance estimates. Z is 
approximately normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance for 
moderately large samples (a condition fulfilled here with 40 observations 
for most subperiods). The critical values for the normal distribution at the 
5 per cent and 10 per cent levels are 1.65 and 1.29 respectively. Z values in 
excess of  these lead to acceptance of  the null hypothesis of  declining X's. 
One asterisk indicates that the null cannot be rejected at the 10 per cent 
level, and two that it cannot be  rejected  at the 5 per cent level.  The 
absolute values of  Z are presented in the table. Table 8:  Pooled Results:  Group 2 
(Germany, France and Italy) 
Germany  Pr  0.008  0.003  -0.003  0.005 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
h  0.31"  0.65"  1.11-  0.50** 
(0.12)  (0.18)  (0.19)  (0.14) 
France  PI  0.005  0.006  0.003  0.004 
(0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
h  0.50  0.12  0.25  0.50 
(0.26) "  (0.19)  (0.1 8)  (0.20)" 
Italy  P'  0.006  0.006  0.005  0.006 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
h  0.43"  0.41"  0.42"  0.55" 
(0.15)  (0.1 6)  (0.10)  (0.12) 




Note:  A SURE estimation technique and the same instrumental variables as for 
Table 1 results  are employed  here.  Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. 
0.007  0.005 
(0.002)  (0.002) 
P'  0.006  0.004 
(0.003)  (0.002) 
0.007  0.007 




h  0.38"  0.41 *' 
(0.09)  (0.11) 
Log likelihood  257.20  407.30 
P'  0.007  0.006  0.005 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
h  0.38"  0.40-  0.53" 
(0.09)  (0.11)  (0.08) 
Log likelihood  257.10  405.70  650.60 APPENDIX 
Data and Replication Results 
Data for eight OECD countries, including the United States, Japan, 
Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy are 
collated. 
Quarterly total  consumption expenditure,  disposable income  and 
exports data are obtained from the OECD National Accounts.  Total 
personal consumption less purchases of  durables is calculated for the 
subset of  countries (namely, the United States, Japan, France, Italy, the 
United Kingdom and Canada) which have the appropriate statistics 
available.  All data are measured in per capita terms. 
Unemployment, population and interest rate statistics are also obtained 
from the OECD. 
The sample period for each country extends from 1960:l to 1988:4 with 
the exception of  Japan with a sample period ending in 1988:l. 
The unsuccessful attempts to replicate J  and P's  results are reported 
only for the two largest countries in their sample, namely, the United 
States and Japan.  Table A1 details our estimates for these countries 
over both J and P's  original sample period and an updated period.  J 
and P source the National  Accounts,  OECD,  Volume  11,  Detailed 
Statistics, 1986 for data on Sweden, the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, 
Spain and Greece.  Equivalent data for the US  were taken from The 
Economic Report of  the President (1986). 
As mentioned in the text, J and P define consumption to "...  exclude 
expenditure on durables, ... [namely] appliances, furniture and means of 
transportation",  and use the first lag of  non-durables consumption, 
personal disposable income, government expenditure and exports as 
instruments.  However, in order to reproduce J and P's  instrumental 
variables co-efficient estimates for the US, it was necessary to exclude personal consumption expenditure both on durable goods and on non- 
durable services.  For Japan, it was necessary to use national disposable 
income  (which  includes the  business  sector) rather  than  personal 
disposable income, and total government outlays as an instrument 
rather than the national accounts measure of  government expenditure 
(used for the USA).  With these inconsistent definitions, it was possible 
to reproduce J and P's  original estimates shown in the last two columns 
of  Table Al.  The estimates from consistently defined data are also 
shown in Table Al, both for the original sample period as used by J and 
P, and for a larger, more up-to-date sample. 
This replication exercise also revealed that the estimates of  a1 are often 
very close to 1, suggesting that J and P's model (equation (12) in the 
text) collapses to a linear equation in first differences: 
A.l: Tests for Non-Stationarity and Non-Zero Drift 
Augmented  Dickey-Fuller (1979, 1981) and Phillips-Perron (1988) Zt 
tests for non-stationarity are set out in Tables A2 and A3.  The ADF 
procedure also allows a test of  the significance of  the constant term 
which indicates the presence of  non-zero drift.  Notwithstanding the 
small sample problems associated with these tests,l2 both the ADF and 
Phillips-Perron  Zt tests find a unit root in consumption, income and 
remaining instruments for both the US and Japan at the 5%  significance 
level.  The Zt test reports US  Consumption of  Non-Durables to be 
trend stationary at the 10% significance level and the ADF statistic on 
the constant term cannot reject non-zero drift for this variable alone. 
12  Given the unworkably small size of  J and P's samples, the ADF and Phillips- 
Perron tests are reported over our extended estimation periods. It should be noted, 
however, that these tests evidence a drop in power when applied to samples of less 
than 100 observations. Table A1 
The Excess Sensitivity of Consumption: Japelli & Pagano's  NLIV 
Method 
Country  Para-  Starting  NLIV  (t-statis  tic)  Error Sum  Japelli & Pagano 
meters  Values  Estimates  of  Squares  NLrV  (t-statistic) 
Estimates 
U.S.  a0  0.00  45.30  (0.75) 
(1  961  -1 984)  a1  1.00  1.00  (46.70) 
h  0.20  0.42  (4.77)  36309.83  0.21  (2.30) 
a0  10.00t  6.20  (0.07) 
a1  10.00  0.75  (5.44) 
h  10.00  0.77  (15.61)  84328.19 
(1  961 -1 990)  a0  0.00  7.34  (0.13) 
a1  1  .OO  1.02  (35.67) 
h  0.20  0.51  (5.62)  61929.45 
a0  10.00t  -163.00  (-1.93) 
a1  10.00  0.75  (6.88) 
h  10.00  0.86+  (15.61)  149654.38 
t J and P's model displayed some sensitivity to parameter starting values.  Grid 
searches reveal two optima both for Japan and the US.  However, in each case, 
estimates originating from the more theoretically plausible starting values also 
displayed the lower error sum of squares. 
*   he estimated X increases for the US when the sample period is extended to the 
1990s.  Since  this  longer  and  more recent  period  encompassed  increasing 
deregulation of  financial markets, it would seem more reasonable to expect any 
liquidity constraints to be declining rather than increasing. Table A2:  ADF Tests for Non-Stationarity 
Country  Updated Sample 










Where CND is  consumption of non-durables, PDY is personal disposable income, 
GE is govenunent expenditure and X is exports. 
Underlined statistics denote those regressions which display a significant trend. 
Critical values at the 5% level for these statistics are -3.60 and 3.20 on the constant 
term;  all other tests find an insigruficant trend and face critical values at the 5% level 
of  -3.00 and 261 on the constant tenn. 
The null of  non-stationarity is rejected at the 5%  level. Table A3:  Phillips-Perron Zt Tests for Non-Stationarity 
Country  Variable  Sample  Zt 
period  With Trend  No Trend 
United States  CND  1959-1990  -2.86*  -0.25 
PDY  -1.88  -0.99 
GE  -1.96  -1.51 
X  -2.40  -0.68 
CND  1972-1989  -2.44  0.69 
PDY  -3.39  -0.93 
GE  -2.19  -0.85 
X  -2.31  -2.31 
" The null of  non-stationarity is rejected at the 5% level with critical values of -3.60 
and -3.00 for the test with a trend and excluding a trend respectively. 
*  The null of  non-stationarity is  rejected at the 10%  level with critical values of  -3.24 
and -2.63 for the test with and without a trend respectively. REFERENCES 
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